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**BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY
LETTERS TO SHAREHOLDERS
1965-2014**





BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY LETTERS TO SHAREHOLDERS

By Warren E. Buffett

1965-2014

	<i>Annual Percentage Change</i>		
	<u>Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire</u>	<u>Per-Share Market Price of Berkshire</u>	<u>S&P 500 with Dividends</u>
1965.....	23.8%	49.5%	10.0%
1966.....	20.3	(3.4)	(11.7)
1967.....	11.0	13.3	30.9
1968.....	19.0	77.8	11.0
1969.....	16.2	19.4	(8.4)
1970.....	12.0	(4.6)	3.9
1971.....	16.4	80.5	14.6
1972.....	21.7	8.1	18.9
1973.....	4.7	(2.5)	(14.8)
1974.....	5.5	(48.7)	(26.4)
1975.....	21.9	2.5	37.2
1976.....	59.3	129.3	23.6
1977.....	31.9	46.8	(7.4)
1978.....	24.0	14.5	6.4
1979.....	35.7	102.5	18.2
1980.....	19.3	32.8	32.3
1981.....	31.4	31.8	(5.0)
1982.....	40.0	38.4	21.4
1983.....	32.3	69.0	22.4
1984.....	13.6	(2.7)	6.1
1985.....	48.2	93.7	31.6
1986.....	26.1	14.2	18.6

	<i>Book Value</i>	<i>Market Price</i>	<i>S&P 500</i>
1987.....	19.5	4.6	5.1
1988.....	20.1	59.3	16.6
1989.....	44.4	84.6	31.7
1990.....	7.4	(23.1)	(3.1)
1991.....	39.6	35.6	30.5
1992.....	20.3	29.8	7.6
1993.....	14.3	38.9	10.1
1994.....	13.9	25.0	1.3
1995.....	43.1	57.4	37.6
1996.....	31.8	6.2	23.0
1997.....	34.1	34.9	33.4
1998.....	48.3	52.2	28.6
1999.....	0.5	(19.9)	21.0
2000.....	6.5	26.6	(9.1)
2001.....	(6.2)	6.5	(11.9)
2002.....	10.0	(3.8)	(22.1)
2003.....	21.0	15.8	28.7
2004.....	10.5	4.3	10.9
2005.....	6.4	0.8	4.9
2006.....	18.4	24.1	15.8
2007.....	11.0	28.7	5.5
2008.....	(9.6)	(31.8)	(37.0)
2009.....	19.8	2.7	26.5
2010.....	13.0	21.4	15.1
2011.....	4.6	(4.7)	2.1
2012.....	14.4	16.8	16.0
2013.....	18.2	32.7	32.4
2014.....	8.3	27.0	13.7
Compounded annual gain (1965-2014)	19.4%	21.6%	9.9%
Overall gain.....	751,113%	1,826,163%	11,196%

Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.

The S&P 500 numbers are **pre-tax** whereas the Berkshire numbers are **after-tax**. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.

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Introduction

Warren E. Buffett first took control of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., a small textile company, in April of 1965. A share changed hands for around \$18 at the time. Fifty letters to shareholders later, the same share traded for \$226,000, compounding investor capital at just under 21% per year—a multiplier of 12,556 times.

Buffett has said many times that he “was wired at birth to allocate capital.” By allocating resources to assets and endeavors that have the greatest potential for gain, Buffett has guided Berkshire to creating enormous value—not only for shareholders, but for the managers, employees, and customers of its holdings.

The numbers and charts you see on the following pages tell the story of a compounding machine. The rest of the book tells of the people, companies, and philosophy that have driven it for five decades.

In addition to providing an astounding case study on Berkshire’s success, Buffett shows an incredible willingness to share his methods and act as a teacher to his many students.

I put this compilation together as thanks to Warren’s positive influence on myself and many, many others.

Max Olson

March 3, 2015


Mountain View, CA

P.S. I owe a huge thanks to Tracy Britt, for working with me to finish this book, Deb Ray for scouring Warren’s archives for the information I needed, and to Guy Spier for suggesting I make the book public.



NOTES: Formatting of letters prior to 1998 was reproduced as close as possible to match the original. Page numbers mentioned within the letters themselves refer to pages in their original Annual Reports (available post-1994 at <http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/>).

Growth of \$100



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Berkshire Hathaway Inc.

Corporate Genealogy

In 1929, several textile operations with much common ownership were amalgamated with Berkshire Cotton Manufacturing Co. (incorporated 1889), immediately renamed Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates, Inc. The merging mills were Valley Falls Co., Coventry Co., Greylock Mills, and Fort Dummer Mills, incorporated in 1853, 1865, 1880 and 1910 respectively. Although the documentation is not perfect, it is believed that the earliest progenitor of these corporations began business in 1806.

The resulting operation was a giant, accounting for about 25% of the country's fine cotton textile production. In the 1930s its many mills utilized approximately 1% of the electric output in the New England states. But profitability did not follow volume and preferred dividends were omitted late in 1930 and for six years thereafter.

World War II and the immediate postwar years produced extraordinary profitability and great balance sheet strength. In 1955, Hathaway Manufacturing Co., a New Bedford based manufacturer of both synthetic and cotton textiles was merged into Berkshire Fine Spinning and the name was immediately changed to Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Hathaway was founded in 1888 by Horatio Hathaway and included Hetty Green as an original shareholder with 6¼% ownership.

The combined enterprise had over 10,000 employees and owned close to six million square feet of plant but the subsequent financial record was just as dismal as that which followed the previous grand consolidation of 1929.

After the merger, Berkshire Hathaway's summarized balance sheet was as follows at its fiscal year-end September 30, 1955:

Assets		Liabilities and Stockholders' Equity	
Cash	\$ 4,169,000	Accounts Payable and	
Marketable Securities	4,580,000	Accrued Expenses	\$ 4,048,000
Accounts Receivable and			
Inventories.	28,918,000		
Net Property, Plant and		Stockholders' Equity —	
Equipment.	16,656,000	2,294,564 shares outstanding;	
Other Assets.	1,125,000	book value \$22.40 per share . .	51,400,000
	<u>\$55,448,000</u>		<u>\$55,448,000</u>

During the nine following years, sales of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. aggregated approximately \$530 million. A reconciliation of shareholders' equity for these nine years follows:

Stockholders' equity at September 30, 1955	\$51,400,000
Additions to capital surplus	888,000
Aggregate net loss-from operations 1956-64	(10,138,000)
Cash dividends paid 1956-64	(6,929,000)
Repurchases of common stock	(13,082,000)
Stockholders' equity at October 3, 1964	<u>\$22,139,000</u>

Berkshire Hathaway Inc.'s summarized balance sheet at October 3, 1964 was as follows:

Assets		Liabilities and Stockholders' Equity	
Cash	\$ 920,000	Notes Payable	\$ 2,500,000
Accounts Receivable and		Accounts Payable and	
Inventories.	19,140,000	Accrued Expenses	3,248,000
Net Property, Plant and		Total Liabilities	5,746,000
Equipment.	7,571,000	Stockholders' Equity —	
Other Assets.	256,000	1,137,776 shares outstanding;	
	<u>\$27,887,000</u>	book value \$19.46 per share . .	22,139,000
			<u>\$27,887,000</u>

Berkshire Hathaway Inc.

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

First, a few words about accounting. The merger with Diversified Retailing Company, Inc. at yearend adds two new complications in the presentation of our financial results. After the merger, our ownership of Blue Chip Stamps increased to approximately 58% and, therefore, the accounts of that company must be fully consolidated in the Balance Sheet and Statement of Earnings presentation of Berkshire. In previous reports, our share of the net earnings only of Blue Chip had been included as a single item on Berkshire's Statement of Earnings, and there had been a similar one-line inclusion on our Balance Sheet of our share of their net assets.

This full consolidation of sales, expenses, receivables, inventories, debt, etc. produces an aggregation of figures from many diverse businesses—textiles, insurance, candy, newspapers, trading stamps—with dramatically different economic characteristics. In some of these your ownership is 100% but, in those businesses which are owned by Blue Chip but fully consolidated, your ownership as a Berkshire shareholder is only 58%. (Ownership by others of the balance of these businesses is accounted for by the large minority interest item on the liability side of the Balance Sheet.) Such a grouping of Balance Sheet and Earnings items—some wholly owned, some partly owned—tends to obscure economic reality more than illuminate it. In fact, it represents a form of presentation that we never prepare for internal use during the year and which is of no value to us in any management activities.

For that reason, throughout the report we provide much separate financial information and commentary on the various segments of the business to help you evaluate Berkshire's performance and prospects. Much of this segmented information is mandated by SEC disclosure rules and covered in "Management's Discussion" on pages 29 to 34. And in this letter we try to present to you a view of our various operating entities from the same perspective that we view them managerially.

A second complication arising from the merger is that the 1977 figures shown in this report are different from the 1977 figures shown in the report we mailed to you last year. Accounting convention requires that when two entities such as Diversified and Berkshire are merged, all financial data subsequently must be presented as if the companies had been merged at the time they were formed rather than just recently. So the enclosed financial statements, in effect, pretend that in 1977 (and earlier years) the Diversified-Berkshire merger already had taken place, even though the actual merger date was December 30, 1978. This shifting base makes comparative commentary confusing and, from time to time in our narrative report, we will talk of figures and performance for Berkshire shareholders as historically reported to you rather than as restated after the Diversified merger.

With that preamble it can be stated that, with or without restated figures, 1978 was a good year. Operating earnings, exclusive of capital gains, at 19.4% of beginning shareholders' investment were within a fraction of our 1972 record. While we believe it is improper to include capital gains or losses in evaluating the performance of a single year, they are an important component of the longer term record. Because of such gains, Berkshire's long-term growth in equity per share has been greater than would be indicated by compounding the returns from operating earnings that we have reported annually.

For example, over the last three years—generally a bonanza period for the insurance industry, our largest profit producer—Berkshire's per share net worth virtually has doubled, thereby com-

pounding at about 25% annually through a combination of good operating earnings and fairly substantial capital gains. Neither this 25% equity gain from all sources nor the 19.4% equity gain from operating earnings in 1978 is sustainable. The insurance cycle has turned downward in 1979, and it is almost certain that operating earnings measured by return on equity will fall this year. However, operating earnings measured in dollars are likely to increase on the much larger shareholders' equity now employed in the business.

In contrast to this cautious view about near term return from operations, we are optimistic about prospects for long term return from major equity investments held by our insurance companies. We make no attempt to predict how security markets will behave; successfully forecasting short term stock price movements is something we think neither we nor anyone else can do. In the longer run, however, we feel that many of our major equity holdings are going to be worth considerably more money than we paid, and that investment gains will add significantly to the operating returns of the insurance group.

Sources of Earnings

To give you a better picture of just where Berkshire's earnings are produced, we show below a table which requires a little explanation. Berkshire owns close to 58% of Blue Chip which, in addition to 100% ownership of several businesses, owns 80% of Wesco Financial Corporation. Thus, Berkshire's equity in Wesco's earnings is about 46%. In aggregate, businesses that we control have about 7,000 full-time employees and generate revenues of over \$500 million.

The table shows the overall earnings of each major operating category on a pre-tax basis (several of the businesses have low tax rates because of significant amounts of tax-exempt interest and dividend income), as well as the share of those earnings belonging to Berkshire both on a pre-tax and after-tax basis. Significant capital gains or losses attributable to any of the businesses are not shown in the operating earnings figure, but are aggregated on the "Realized Securities Gain" line at the bottom of the table. Because of various accounting and tax intricacies, the figures in the table should not be treated as holy writ, but rather viewed as close approximations of the 1977 and 1978 earnings contributions of our constituent businesses.

<i>(in thousands of dollars)</i>	<i>Earnings Before Income Taxes</i>				<i>Net Earnings After Tax</i>	
	<i>Total</i>		<i>Berkshire Share</i>		<i>Berkshire Share</i>	
	<i>1978</i>	<i>1977</i>	<i>1978</i>	<i>1977</i>	<i>1978</i>	<i>1977</i>
Total – all entities	\$66,180	\$57,089	\$54,350	\$42,234	\$39,242	\$30,393
Earnings from operations:						
Insurance Group:						
Underwriting	\$ 3,001	\$ 5,802	\$ 3,000	\$ 5,802	\$ 1,560	\$ 3,017
Net investment income . .	19,705	12,804	19,691	12,804	16,400	11,360
Berkshire-Waumbec textiles .	2,916	(620)	2,916	(620)	1,342	(322)
Associated Retail Stores, Inc.	2,757	2,775	2,757	2,775	1,176	1,429
See's Candies	12,482	12,840	7,013	6,598	3,049	2,974
Buffalo Evening News	(2,913)	751	(1,637)	389	(738)	158
Blue Chip Stamps - Parent . .	2,133	1,091	1,198	566	1,382	892
Illinois National Bank and Trust Company	4,822	3,800	4,710	3,706	4,262	3,288
Wesco Financial Corporation – Parent . .	1,771	2,006	777	813	665	419
Mutual Savings and Loan Association	10,556	6,779	4,638	2,747	3,042	1,946
Interest on Debt	(5,566)	(5,302)	(4,546)	(4,255)	(2,349)	(2,129)
Other	720	165	438	102	261	48
Total Earnings from Operations	\$52,384	\$42,891	\$40,955	\$31,427	\$30,052	\$23,080
Realized Securities Gain	13,796	14,198	13,395	10,807	9,190	7,313
Total Earnings	\$66,180	\$57,089	\$54,350	\$42,234	\$39,242	\$30,393

Blue Chip and Wesco are public companies with reporting requirements of their own. Later in this report we are reproducing the narrative reports of the principal executives of both companies, describing their 1978 operations. Some of the figures they utilize will not match to the penny the ones we use in this report, again because of accounting and tax complexities. But their comments should be helpful to you in understanding the underlying economic characteristics of these important partly-owned businesses. A copy of the full annual report of either company will be mailed to any shareholder of Berkshire upon request to Mr. Robert H. Bird for Blue Chips Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040, or to Mrs. Bette Deckard for Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109.

Textiles

Earnings of \$1.3 million in 1978, while much improved from 1977, still represent a low return on the \$17 million of capital employed in this business. Textile plant and equipment are on the books for a very small fraction of what it would cost to replace such equipment today. And, despite the age of the equipment, much of it is functionally similar to new equipment being installed by the industry. But despite this “bargain cost” of fixed assets, capital turnover is relatively low reflecting required high investment levels in receivables and inventory compared to sales. Slow capital turnover, coupled with low profit margins on sales, inevitably produces inadequate returns on capital. Obvious approaches to improved profit margins involve differentiation of product, lowered manufacturing costs through more efficient equipment or better utilization of people, redirection toward fabrics enjoying stronger market trends, etc. Our management is diligent in pursuing such objectives. The problem, of course, is that our competitors are just as diligently doing the same thing.

The textile industry illustrates in textbook style how producers of relatively undifferentiated goods in capital intensive businesses must earn inadequate returns except under conditions of tight supply or real shortage. As long as excess productive capacity exists, prices tend to reflect direct operating costs rather than capital employed. Such a supply-excess condition appears likely to prevail most of the time in the textile industry, and our expectations are for profits of relatively modest amounts in relation to capital.

We hope we don't get into too many more businesses with such tough economic characteristics. But, as we have stated before: (1) our textile businesses are very important employers in their communities, (2) management has been straightforward in reporting on problems and energetic in attacking them, (3) labor has been cooperative and understanding in facing our common problems, and (4) the business should average modest cash returns relative to investment. As long as these conditions prevail—and we expect that they will—we intend to continue to support our textile business despite more attractive alternative uses for capital.

Insurance Underwriting

The number one contributor to Berkshire's overall excellent results in 1978 was the segment of National Indemnity Company's insurance operation run by Phil Liesche. On about \$90 million of earned premiums, an underwriting profit of approximately \$11 million was realized, a truly extraordinary achievement even against the background of excellent industry conditions. Under Phil's leadership, with outstanding assistance by Roland Miller in Underwriting and Bill Lyons in Claims, this segment of National Indemnity (including National Fire and Marine Insurance Company, which operates as a running mate) had one of its best years in a long history of performances which, in aggregate, far outshine those of the industry. Present successes reflect credit not only upon present managers, but equally upon the business talents of Jack Ringwalt, founder of National Indemnity, whose operating philosophy remains etched upon the company.

Home and Automobile Insurance Company had its best year since John Seward stepped in and straightened things out in 1975. Its results are combined in this report with those of Phil Liesche's operation under the insurance category entitled "Specialized Auto and General Liability".

Worker's Compensation was a mixed bag in 1978. In its first year as a subsidiary, Cypress Insurance Company, managed by Milt Thornton, turned in outstanding results. The worker's compensation line can cause large underwriting losses when rapid inflation interacts with changing social concepts, but Milt has a cautious and highly professional staff to cope with these problems. His performance in 1978 has reinforced our very good feelings about this purchase.

Frank DeNardo came with us in the spring of 1978 to straighten out National Indemnity's California Worker's Compensation business which, up to that point, had been a disaster. Frank has the experience and intellect needed to correct the major problems of the Los Angeles office. Our volume in this department now is running only about 25% of what it was eighteen months ago, and early indications are that Frank is making good progress.

George Young's reinsurance department continues to produce very large sums for investment relative to premium volume, and thus gives us reasonably satisfactory overall results. However, underwriting results still are not what they should be and can be. It is very easy to fool yourself regarding underwriting results in reinsurance (particularly in casualty lines involving long delays in settlement), and we believe this situation prevails with many of our competitors. Unfortunately, self-delusion in company reserving almost always leads to inadequate industry rate levels. If major fac-

tors in the market don't know their true costs, the competitive "fall-out" hits all—even those with adequate cost knowledge. George is quite willing to reduce volume significantly, if needed, to achieve satisfactory underwriting, and we have a great deal of confidence in the long term soundness of this business under his direction.

The homestate operation was disappointing in 1978. Our unsatisfactory underwriting, even though partially explained by an unusual incidence of Midwestern storms, is particularly worrisome against the backdrop of very favorable industry results in the conventional lines written by our homestate group. We have confidence in John Ringwalt's ability to correct this situation. The bright spot in the group was the performance of Kansas Fire and Casualty in its first full year of business. Under Floyd Taylor, this subsidiary got off to a truly remarkable start. Of course, it takes at least several years to evaluate underwriting results, but the early signs are encouraging and Floyd's operation achieved the best loss ratio among the homestate companies in 1978.

Although some segments were disappointing, overall our insurance operation had an excellent year. But of course we should expect a good year when the industry is flying high, as in 1978. It is a virtual certainty that in 1979 the combined ratio (see definition on page 31) for the industry will move up at least a few points, perhaps enough to throw the industry as a whole into an underwriting loss position. For example, in the auto lines—by far the most important area for the industry and for us—CPI figures indicate rates overall were only 3% higher in January 1979 than a year ago. But the items that make up loss costs—auto repair and medical care costs—were up over 9%. How different than yearend 1976 when rates had advanced over 22% in the preceding twelve months, but costs were up 8%.

Margins will remain steady only if rates rise as fast as costs. This assuredly will not be the case in 1979, and conditions probably will worsen in 1980. Our present thinking is that our underwriting performance relative to the industry will improve somewhat in 1979, but every other insurance management probably views its relative prospects with similar optimism—someone is going to be disappointed. Even if we do improve relative to others, we may well have a higher combined ratio and lower underwriting profits in 1979 than we achieved last year.

We continue to look for ways to expand our insurance operation. But your reaction to this intent should not be unrestrained joy. Some of our expansion efforts—largely initiated by your Chairman have been lackluster, others have been expensive failures. We entered the business in 1967 through purchase of the segment which Phil Liesche now manages, and it still remains, by a large margin, the best portion of our insurance business. It is not easy to buy a good insurance business, but our experience has been that it is easier to buy one than create one. However, we will continue to try both approaches, since the rewards for success in this field can be exceptional.

Insurance Investments

We confess considerable optimism regarding our insurance equity investments. Of course, our enthusiasm for stocks is not unconditional. Under some circumstances, common stock investments by insurers make very little sense.

We get excited enough to commit a big percentage of insurance company net worth to equities only when we find (1) businesses we can understand, (2) with favorable long-term prospects, (3) operated by honest and competent people, and (4) priced very attractively. We usually can identify a small number of potential investments meeting requirements (1), (2) and (3), but (4) often prevents action. For example, in 1971 our total common stock position at Berkshire's insurance subsidiaries

amounted to only \$10.7 million at cost, and \$11.7 million at market. There were equities of identifiably excellent companies available—but very few at interesting prices. (An irresistible footnote: in 1971, pension fund managers invested a record 122% of net funds available in equities—at full prices they couldn't buy enough of them. In 1974, after the bottom had fallen out, they committed a then record low of 21% to stocks.)

The past few years have been a different story for us. At the end of 1975 our insurance subsidiaries held common equities with a market value exactly equal to cost of \$39.3 million. At the end of 1978 this position had been increased to equities (including a convertible preferred) with a cost of \$129.1 million and a market value of \$216.5 million. During the intervening three years we also had realized pre-tax gains from common equities of approximately \$24.7 million. Therefore, our overall unrealized and realized pre-tax gains in equities for the three year period came to approximately \$112 million. During this same interval the Dow-Jones Industrial Average declined from 852 to 805. It was a marvelous period for the value-oriented equity buyer.

We continue to find for our insurance portfolios small portions of really outstanding businesses that are available, through the auction pricing mechanism of security markets, at prices dramatically cheaper than the valuations inferior businesses command on negotiated sales.

This program of acquisition of small fractions of businesses (common stocks) at bargain prices, for which little enthusiasm exists, contrasts sharply with general corporate acquisition activity, for which much enthusiasm exists. It seems quite clear to us that either corporations are making very significant mistakes in purchasing entire businesses at prices prevailing in negotiated transactions and takeover bids, or that we eventually are going to make considerable sums of money buying small portions of such businesses at the greatly discounted valuations prevailing in the stock market. (A second footnote: in 1978 pension managers, a group that logically should maintain the longest of investment perspectives, put only 9% of net available funds into equities—breaking the record low figure set in 1974 and tied in 1977.)

We are not concerned with whether the market quickly revalues upward securities that we believe are selling at bargain prices. In fact, we prefer just the opposite since, in most years, we expect to have funds available to be a net buyer of securities. And consistent attractive purchasing is likely to prove to be of more eventual benefit to us than any selling opportunities provided by a short-term run up in stock prices to levels at which we are unwilling to continue buying.

Our policy is to concentrate holdings. We try to avoid buying a little of this or that when we are only lukewarm about the business or its price. When we are convinced as to attractiveness, we believe in buying worthwhile amounts.

Equity holdings of our insurance companies with a market value of over \$8 million on December 31, 1978 were as follows:

<u>No. of Shares</u>	<u>Company</u>	<u>Cost</u> (000's omitted)	<u>Market</u>
246,450	American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.	\$ 6,082	\$ 8,626
1,294,308	Government Employees Insurance Company Common Stock	4,116	9,060
1,986,953	Government Employees Insurance Company Convertible Preferred.	19,417	28,314
592,650	Interpublic Group of Companies	4,531	19,039
1,066,934	Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation	18,085	18,671
453,800	Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc.	7,534	10,267
953,750	SAFECO Corporation	23,867	26,467
934,300	The Washington Post Company	10,628	43,445
	Total.	<u>\$ 94,260</u>	<u>\$163,889</u>
	All other Holdings	<u>39,506</u>	<u>57,040</u>
	Total Equities	<u>\$133,766</u>	<u>\$220,929</u>

In some cases our indirect interest in earning power is becoming quite substantial. For example, note our holdings of 953,750 shares of SAFECO Corp. SAFECO probably is the best run large property and casualty insurance company in the United States. Their underwriting abilities are simply superb, their loss reserving is conservative, and their investment policies make great sense.

SAFECO is a much better insurance operation than our own (although we believe certain segments of ours are much better than average), is better than one we could develop and, similarly, is far better than any in which we might negotiate purchase of a controlling interest. Yet our purchase of SAFECO was made at substantially under book value. We paid less than 100 cents on the dollar for the best company in the business, when far more than 100 cents on the dollar is being paid for mediocre companies in corporate transactions. And there is no way to start a new operation—with necessarily uncertain prospects—at less than 100 cents on the dollar.

Of course, with a minor interest we do not have the right to direct or even influence management policies of SAFECO. But why should we wish to do this? The record would indicate that they do a better job of managing their operations than we could do ourselves. While there may be less excitement and prestige in sitting back and letting others do the work, we think that is all one loses by accepting a passive participation in excellent management. Because, quite clearly, if one controlled a company run as well as SAFECO, the proper policy also would be to sit back and let management do its job.

Earnings attributable to the shares of SAFECO owned by Berkshire at yearend amounted to \$6.1 million during 1978, but only the dividends received (about 18% of earnings) are reflected in our operating earnings. We believe the balance, although not reportable, to be just as real in terms of eventual benefit to us as the amount distributed. In fact, SAFECO's retained earnings (or those of other well-run companies if they have opportunities to employ additional capital advantageously) may well eventually have a value to shareholders greater than 100 cents on the dollar.

We are not at all unhappy when our wholly-owned businesses retain all of their earnings if they can utilize internally those funds at attractive rates. Why should we feel differently about retention of earnings by companies in which we hold small equity interests, but where the record indicates even better prospects for profitable employment of capital? (This proposition cuts the other way, of course, in industries with low capital requirements, or if management has a record of plowing

capital into projects of low profitability; then earnings should be paid out or used to repurchase shares—often by far the most attractive option for capital utilization.)

The aggregate level of such retained earnings attributable to our equity interests in fine companies is becoming quite substantial. It does not enter into our reported operating earnings, but we feel it well may have equal long-term significance to our shareholders. Our hope is that conditions continue to prevail in securities markets which allow our insurance companies to buy large amounts of underlying earning power for relatively modest outlays. At some point market conditions undoubtedly will again preclude such bargain buying but, in the meantime, we will try to make the most of opportunities.

Banking

Under Gene Abegg and Pete Jeffrey, the Illinois National Bank and Trust Company in Rockford continues to establish new records. Last year's earnings amounted to approximately 2.1% of average assets, about three times the level averaged by major banks. In our opinion, this extraordinary level of earnings is being achieved while maintaining significantly less asset risk than prevails at most of the larger banks.

We purchased the Illinois National Bank in March 1969. It was a first-class operation then, just as it had been ever since Gene Abegg opened the doors in 1931. Since 1968, consumer time deposits have quadrupled, net income has tripled and trust department income has more than doubled, while costs have been closely controlled.

Our experience has been that the manager of an already high-cost operation frequently is uncommonly resourceful in finding new ways to add to overhead, while the manager of a tightly-run operation usually continues to find additional methods to curtail costs, even when his costs are already well below those of his competitors. No one has demonstrated this latter ability better than Gene Abegg.

We are required to divest our bank by December 31, 1980. The most likely approach is to spin it off to Berkshire shareholders some time in the second half of 1980.

Retailing

Upon merging with Diversified, we acquired 100% ownership of Associated Retail Stores, Inc., a chain of about 75 popular priced women's apparel stores. Associated was launched in Chicago on March 7, 1931 with one store, \$3200, and two extraordinary partners, Ben Rosner and Leo Simon. After Mr. Simon's death, the business was offered to Diversified for cash in 1967. Ben was to continue running the business—and run it, he has.

Associated's business has not grown, and it consistently has faced adverse demographic and retailing trends. But Ben's combination of merchandising, real estate and cost-containment skills has produced an outstanding record of profitability, with returns on capital necessarily employed in the business often in the 20% after-tax area.

Ben is now 75 and, like Gene Abegg, 81, at Illinois National and Louie Vincenti, 73, at Wesco, continues daily to bring an almost passionately proprietary attitude to the business. This group of top managers must appear to an outsider to be an overreaction on our part to an OEO bulletin on

age discrimination. While unorthodox, these relationships have been exceptionally rewarding, both financially and personally. It is a real pleasure to work with managers who enjoy coming to work each morning and, once there, instinctively and unerringly think like owners. We are associated with some of the very best.

Warren E. Buffett, Chairman

March 26, 1979

Berkshire – Past, Present and Future

In the Beginning

On May 6, 1964, Berkshire Hathaway, then run by a man named Seabury Stanton, sent a letter to its shareholders offering to buy 225,000 shares of its stock for \$11.375 per share. I had expected the letter; I was surprised by the price.

Berkshire then had 1,583,680 shares outstanding. About 7% of these were owned by Buffett Partnership Ltd. (“BPL”), an investing entity that I managed and in which I had virtually all of my net worth. Shortly before the tender offer was mailed, Stanton had asked me at what price BPL would sell its holdings. I answered \$11.50, and he said, “Fine, we have a deal.” Then came Berkshire’s letter, offering an eighth of a point less. I bristled at Stanton’s behavior and didn’t tender.

That was a monumentally stupid decision.

Berkshire was then a northern textile manufacturer mired in a terrible business. The industry in which it operated was heading south, both metaphorically and physically. And Berkshire, for a variety of reasons, was unable to change course.

That was true even though the industry’s problems had long been widely understood. Berkshire’s own Board minutes of July 29, 1954, laid out the grim facts: “The textile industry in New England started going out of business forty years ago. During the war years this trend was stopped. The trend must continue until supply and demand have been balanced.”

About a year after that board meeting, Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates and Hathaway Manufacturing – both with roots in the 19th Century – joined forces, taking the name we bear today. With its fourteen plants and 10,000 employees, the merged company became the giant of New England textiles. What the two managements viewed as a merger agreement, however, soon morphed into a suicide pact. During the seven years following the consolidation, Berkshire operated at an overall loss, and its net worth shrunk by 37%.

Meanwhile, the company closed nine plants, sometimes using the liquidation proceeds to repurchase shares. And that pattern caught my attention.

I purchased BPL’s first shares of Berkshire in December 1962, anticipating more closings and more repurchases. The stock was then selling for \$7.50, a wide discount from per-share working capital of \$10.25 and book value of \$20.20. Buying the stock at that price was like picking up a discarded cigar butt that had one puff remaining in it. Though the stub might be ugly and soggy, the puff would be free. Once that momentary pleasure was enjoyed, however, no more could be expected.

Berkshire thereafter stuck to the script: It soon closed another two plants, and in that May 1964 move, set out to repurchase shares with the shutdown proceeds. The price that Stanton offered was 50% above the cost of our original purchases. There it was – my free puff, just waiting for me, after which I could look elsewhere for other discarded butts.

Instead, irritated by Stanton’s chiseling, I ignored his offer and began to aggressively buy more Berkshire shares.

By April 1965, BPL owned 392,633 shares (out of 1,017,547 then outstanding) and at an early-May board meeting we formally took control of the company. Through Seabury's and my childish behavior – after all, what was an eighth of a point to either of us? – he lost his job, and I found myself with more than 25% of BPL's capital invested in a terrible business about which I knew very little. I became the dog who caught the car.

Because of Berkshire's operating losses and share repurchases, its net worth at the end of fiscal 1964 had fallen to \$22 million from \$55 million at the time of the 1955 merger. The full \$22 million was required by the textile operation: The company had no excess cash and owed its bank \$2.5 million. (Berkshire's 1964 annual report is reproduced on pages 130-142.)

For a time I got lucky: Berkshire immediately enjoyed two years of good operating conditions. Better yet, its earnings in those years were free of income tax because it possessed a large loss carry-forward that had arisen from the disastrous results in earlier years.

Then the honeymoon ended. During the 18 years following 1966, we struggled unremittingly with the textile business, all to no avail. But stubbornness – stupidity? – has its limits. In 1985, I finally threw in the towel and closed the operation.

* * * * *

Undeterred by my first mistake of committing much of BPL's resources to a dying business, I quickly compounded the error. Indeed, my second blunder was far more serious than the first, eventually becoming the most costly in my career.

Early in 1967, I had Berkshire pay \$8.6 million to buy National Indemnity Company ("NICO"), a small but promising Omaha-based insurer. (A tiny sister company was also included in the deal.) Insurance was in my sweet spot: I understood and liked the industry.

Jack Ringwalt, the owner of NICO, was a long-time friend who wanted to sell to me – me, personally. In no way was his offer intended for Berkshire. So why did I purchase NICO for Berkshire rather than for BPL? I've had 48 years to think about that question, and I've yet to come up with a good answer. I simply made a colossal mistake.

If BPL had been the purchaser, my partners and I would have owned 100% of a fine business, destined to form the base for building the company Berkshire has become. Moreover, our growth would not have been impeded for nearly two decades by the unproductive funds imprisoned in the textile operation. Finally, our subsequent acquisitions would have been owned in their entirety by my partners and me rather than being 39%-owned by the legacy shareholders of Berkshire, to whom we had no obligation. Despite these facts staring me in the face, I opted to marry 100% of an excellent business (NICO) to a 61%-owned terrible business (Berkshire Hathaway), a decision that eventually diverted \$100 billion or so from BPL partners to a collection of strangers.

* * * * *

One more confession and then I'll go on to more pleasant topics: Can you believe that in 1975 I bought Waumbec Mills, another New England textile company? Of course, the purchase price was a "bargain" based on the assets we received and the *projected* synergies with Berkshire's existing textile business. Nevertheless – surprise, surprise – Waumbec was a disaster, with the mill having to be closed down not many years later.

And now some good news: The northern textile industry is finally extinct. You need no longer panic if you hear that I've been spotted wandering around New England.

Charlie Straightens Me Out

My cigar-butt strategy worked very well while I was managing small sums. Indeed, the many dozens of free puffs I obtained in the 1950s made that decade by far the best of my life for both relative and absolute investment performance.

Even then, however, I made a few exceptions to cigar butts, the most important being GEICO. Thanks to a 1951 conversation I had with Lorimer Davidson, a wonderful man who later became CEO of the company, I learned that GEICO was a terrific business and promptly put 65% of my \$9,800 net worth into its shares. Most of my gains in those early years, though, came from investments in mediocre companies that traded at bargain prices. Ben Graham had taught me that technique, and it worked.

But a major weakness in this approach gradually became apparent: Cigar-butt investing was scalable only to a point. With large sums, it would never work well.

In addition, though marginal businesses purchased at cheap prices may be attractive as short-term investments, they are the wrong foundation on which to build a large and enduring enterprise. Selecting a marriage partner clearly requires more demanding criteria than does dating. (Berkshire, it should be noted, would have been a highly satisfactory “date”: If we had taken Seabury Stanton’s \$11.375 offer for our shares, BPL’s weighted annual return on its Berkshire investment would have been about 40%.)

It took Charlie Munger to break my cigar-butt habits and set the course for building a business that could combine huge size with satisfactory profits. Charlie had grown up a few hundred feet from where I now live and as a youth had worked, as did I, in my grandfather’s grocery store. Nevertheless, it was 1959 before I met Charlie, long after he had left Omaha to make Los Angeles his home. I was then 28 and he was 35. The Omaha doctor who introduced us predicted that we would hit it off – and we did.

If you’ve attended our annual meetings, you know Charlie has a wide-ranging brilliance, a prodigious memory, and some firm opinions. I’m not exactly wishy-washy myself, and we sometimes don’t agree. In 56 years, however, we’ve never had an argument. When we differ, Charlie usually ends the conversation by saying: “Warren, think it over and you’ll agree with me because you’re smart and I’m right.”

What most of you do *not* know about Charlie is that architecture is among his passions. Though he began his career as a practicing lawyer (with his time billed at \$15 per hour), Charlie made his first real money in his 30s by designing and building five apartment projects near Los Angeles. Concurrently, he designed the house that he lives in today – some 55 years later. (Like me, Charlie can’t be budged if he is happy in his surroundings.) In recent years, Charlie has designed large dorm complexes at Stanford and the University of Michigan and today, at age 91, is working on another major project.

From my perspective, though, Charlie’s most important architectural feat was the design of today’s Berkshire. The blueprint he gave me was simple: Forget what you know about buying fair businesses at wonderful prices; instead, buy wonderful businesses at fair prices.

Altering my behavior is not an easy task (ask my family). I had enjoyed reasonable success without Charlie's input, so why should I listen to a lawyer who had never spent a day in business school (when – ahem – I had attended *three*). But Charlie never tired of repeating his maxims about business and investing to me, and his logic was irrefutable. Consequently, Berkshire has been built to Charlie's blueprint. My role has been that of general contractor, with the CEOs of Berkshire's subsidiaries doing the real work as sub-contractors.

The year 1972 was a turning point for Berkshire (though not without occasional backsliding on my part – remember my 1975 purchase of Waumbec). We had the opportunity then to buy See's Candy for Blue Chip Stamps, a company in which Charlie, I and Berkshire had major stakes, and which was later merged into Berkshire.

See's was a legendary West Coast manufacturer and retailer of boxed chocolates, then annually earning about \$4 million pre-tax while utilizing only \$8 million of net tangible assets. Moreover, the company had a huge asset that did not appear on its balance sheet: a broad and durable competitive advantage that gave it significant pricing power. That strength was virtually certain to give See's major gains in earnings over time. Better yet, these would materialize with only minor amounts of incremental investment. In other words, See's could be expected to gush cash for decades to come.

The family controlling See's wanted \$30 million for the business, and Charlie rightly said it was worth that much. But I didn't want to pay more than \$25 million and wasn't all that enthusiastic even at that figure. (A price that was three times net tangible assets made me gulp.) My misguided caution could have scuttled a terrific purchase. But, luckily, the sellers decided to take our \$25 million bid.

To date, See's has earned \$1.9 billion pre-tax, with its growth having required added investment of only \$40 million. See's has thus been able to distribute huge sums that have helped Berkshire buy other businesses that, in turn, have themselves produced large distributable profits. (Envision rabbits breeding.) Additionally, through watching See's in action, I gained a business education about the value of powerful brands that opened my eyes to many other profitable investments.

* * * * *

Even with Charlie's blueprint, I have made plenty of mistakes since Waumbec. The most gruesome was Dexter Shoe. When we purchased the company in 1993, it had a terrific record and in no way looked to me like a cigar butt. Its competitive strengths, however, were soon to evaporate because of foreign competition. And I simply didn't see that coming.

Consequently, Berkshire paid \$433 million for Dexter and, rather promptly, its value went to zero. GAAP accounting, however, doesn't come close to recording the magnitude of my error. The fact is that I gave Berkshire stock to the sellers of Dexter rather than cash, and the shares I used for the purchase are now worth about \$5.7 billion. As a financial disaster, this one deserves a spot in the Guinness Book of World Records.

Several of my subsequent errors also involved the use of Berkshire shares to purchase businesses whose earnings were destined to simply limp along. Mistakes of that kind are deadly. Trading shares of a wonderful business – which Berkshire most certainly is – for ownership of a so-so business irreparably destroys value.

We've also suffered financially when this mistake has been committed by companies whose shares Berkshire has owned (with the errors sometimes occurring while I was serving as a director). Too often CEOs seem blind to an elementary reality: The intrinsic value of the shares you give in an acquisition must not be greater than the intrinsic value of the business you receive.

I've yet to see an investment banker quantify this all-important math when he is presenting a stock-for-stock deal to the board of a potential acquirer. Instead, the banker's focus will be on describing "customary" premiums-to-market-price that are currently being paid for acquisitions – an absolutely asinine way to evaluate the attractiveness of an acquisition – or whether the deal will increase the acquirer's earnings-per-share (which in itself should be far from determinative). In striving to achieve the desired per-share number, a panting CEO and his "helpers" will often conjure up fanciful "synergies." (As a director of 19 companies over the years, I've never heard "dis-synergies" mentioned, though I've witnessed plenty of these once deals have closed.) Post mortems of acquisitions, in which reality is honestly compared to the original projections, are rare in American boardrooms. They should instead be standard practice.

I can promise you that long after I'm gone, Berkshire's CEO and Board will carefully make intrinsic value calculations before issuing shares in any acquisitions. You can't get rich trading a hundred-dollar bill for eight tens (even if your advisor has handed you an expensive "fairness" opinion endorsing that swap).

* * * * *

Overall, Berkshire's acquisitions have worked out well – and *very* well in the case of a few large ones. So, too, have our investments in marketable securities. The latter are always valued on our balance sheet at their market prices so any gains – including those unrealized – are immediately reflected in our net worth. But the businesses we buy outright are never revalued upward on our balance sheet, even when we could sell them for many billions of dollars more than their carrying value. The unrecorded gains in the value of Berkshire's subsidiaries have become huge, with these growing at a particularly fast pace in the last decade.

Listening to Charlie has paid off.

Berkshire Today

Berkshire is now a sprawling conglomerate, constantly trying to sprawl further.

Conglomerates, it should be acknowledged, have a terrible reputation with investors. And they richly deserve it. Let me first explain why they are in the doghouse, and then I will go on to describe why the conglomerate form brings huge and enduring advantages to Berkshire.

Since I entered the business world, conglomerates have enjoyed several periods of extreme popularity, the silliest of which occurred in the late 1960s. The drill for conglomerate CEOs then was simple: By personality, promotion or dubious accounting – and often by all three – these managers drove a fledgling conglomerate’s stock to, say, 20 times earnings and then issued shares as fast as possible to acquire another business selling at ten-or-so times earnings. They immediately applied “pooling” accounting to the acquisition, which – with not a dime’s worth of change in the underlying businesses – automatically increased per-share earnings, and used the rise as proof of managerial genius. They next explained to investors that this sort of talent justified the maintenance, or even the enhancement, of the acquirer’s p/e multiple. And, finally, they promised to endlessly repeat this procedure and thereby create ever-increasing per-share earnings.

Wall Street’s love affair with this hocus-pocus intensified as the 1960s rolled by. The Street’s denizens are always ready to suspend disbelief when dubious maneuvers are used to manufacture rising per-share earnings, particularly if these acrobatics produce mergers that generate huge fees for investment bankers. Auditors willingly sprinkled their holy water on the conglomerates’ accounting and sometimes even made suggestions as to how to further juice the numbers. For many, gushers of easy money washed away ethical sensitivities.

Since the per-share earnings gains of an expanding conglomerate came from exploiting p/e differences, its CEO had to search for businesses selling at low multiples of earnings. These, of course, were characteristically mediocre businesses with poor long-term prospects. This incentive to bottom-fish usually led to a conglomerate’s collection of underlying businesses becoming more and more junky. That mattered little to investors: It was deal velocity and pooling accounting they looked to for increased earnings.

The resulting firestorm of merger activity was fanned by an adoring press. Companies such as ITT, Litton Industries, Gulf & Western, and LTV were lionized, and their CEOs became celebrities. (These once-famous conglomerates are now long gone. As Yogi Berra said, “Every Napoleon meets his Watergate.”)

Back then, accounting shenanigans of all sorts – many of them ridiculously transparent – were excused or overlooked. Indeed, having an accounting wizard at the helm of an expanding conglomerate was viewed as a huge plus: Shareholders in those instances could be sure that *reported* earnings would never disappoint, no matter how bad the operating realities of the business might become.

In the late 1960s, I attended a meeting at which an acquisitive CEO bragged of his “bold, imaginative accounting.” Most of the analysts listening responded with approving nods, seeing themselves as having found a manager whose forecasts were certain to be met, whatever the business results might be.

Eventually, however, the clock struck twelve, and everything turned to pumpkins and mice. Once again, it became evident that business models based on the serial issuances of overpriced shares – just like chain-letter models – most assuredly redistribute wealth, but in no way create it. Both phenomena, nevertheless, periodically blossom in our country – they are every promoter’s dream – though often they appear in a carefully-crafted disguise. The ending is always the same: Money flows from the gullible to the fraudster. And with stocks, unlike chain letters, the sums hijacked can be staggering.

At both BPL and Berkshire, we have *never* invested in companies that are hell-bent on issuing shares. That behavior is one of the surest indicators of a promotion-minded management, weak accounting, a stock that is overpriced and – all too often – outright dishonesty.

* * * * *

So what do Charlie and I find so attractive about Berkshire’s conglomerate structure? To put the case simply: If the conglomerate form is used judiciously, it is an ideal structure for maximizing long-term capital growth.

One of the heralded virtues of capitalism is that it efficiently allocates funds. The argument is that markets will direct investment to promising businesses and deny it to those destined to wither. That is true: With all its excesses, market-driven allocation of capital is usually far superior to any alternative.

Nevertheless, there are often obstacles to the rational movement of capital. As those 1954 Berkshire minutes made clear, capital withdrawals within the textile industry that should have been obvious were delayed for decades because of the vain hopes and self-interest of managements. Indeed, I myself delayed abandoning our obsolete textile mills for far too long.

A CEO with capital employed in a declining operation seldom elects to massively redeploy that capital into unrelated activities. A move of that kind would usually require that long-time associates be fired and mistakes be admitted. Moreover, it’s unlikely *that* CEO would be the manager you would wish to handle the redeployment job even if he or she was inclined to undertake it.

At the shareholder level, taxes and frictional costs weigh heavily on individual investors when they attempt to reallocate capital among businesses and industries. Even tax-free institutional investors face major costs as they move capital because they usually need intermediaries to do this job. A lot of mouths with expensive tastes then clamor to be fed – among them investment bankers, accountants, consultants, lawyers and such capital-reallocators as leveraged buyout operators. Money-shufflers don’t come cheap.

In contrast, a conglomerate such as Berkshire is perfectly positioned to allocate capital rationally and at minimal cost. Of course, form itself is no guarantee of success: We have made plenty of mistakes, and we will make more. Our structural advantages, however, are formidable.

At Berkshire, we can – without incurring taxes or much in the way of other costs – move huge sums from businesses that have limited opportunities for incremental investment to other sectors with greater promise. Moreover, we are free of historical biases created by lifelong association with a given industry and are not subject to pressures from colleagues having a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. That’s important: If horses had controlled investment decisions, there would have been no auto industry.

Another major advantage we possess is the ability to buy *pieces* of wonderful businesses – a.k.a. common stocks. That’s not a course of action open to most managements. Over our history, this strategic alternative has proved to be very helpful; a broad range of options always sharpens decision-making. The businesses we are offered by the stock market every day – in small pieces, to be sure – are often far more attractive than the businesses we are concurrently being offered in their entirety. Additionally, the gains we’ve realized from marketable securities have helped us make certain large acquisitions that would otherwise have been beyond our financial capabilities.

In effect, the world is Berkshire’s oyster – a world offering us a range of opportunities far beyond those realistically open to most companies. We are limited, of course, to businesses whose economic prospects we can evaluate. And that’s a serious limitation: Charlie and I have no idea what a great many companies will look like ten years from now. But that limitation is much smaller than that borne by an executive whose experience has been confined to a single industry. On top of that, we can profitably scale to a *far* larger size than the many businesses that are constrained by the limited potential of the single industry in which they operate.

I mentioned earlier that See’s Candy had produced huge earnings compared to its modest capital requirements. We would have loved, of course, to intelligently use those funds to expand our candy operation. But our many attempts to do so were largely futile. So, without incurring tax inefficiencies or frictional costs, we have used the excess funds generated by See’s to help purchase other businesses. If See’s had remained a stand-alone company, its earnings would have had to be distributed to investors to redeploy, sometimes after being heavily depleted by large taxes and, almost always, by significant frictional and agency costs.

* * * * *

Berkshire has one further advantage that has become increasingly important over the years: We are now the home of choice for the owners and managers of many outstanding businesses.

Families that own successful businesses have multiple options when they contemplate sale. Frequently, the best decision is to do nothing. There are worse things in life than having a prosperous business that one understands well. But sitting tight is seldom recommended by Wall Street. (Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.)

When one part of a family wishes to sell while others wish to continue, a public offering often makes sense. But, when owners wish to cash out entirely, they usually consider one of two paths.

The first is sale to a competitor who is salivating at the possibility of wringing “synergies” from the combining of the two companies. This buyer invariably contemplates getting rid of large numbers of the seller’s associates, the very people who have helped the owner build his business. A caring owner, however – and there are plenty of them – usually does not want to leave his long-time associates sadly singing the old country song: “*She got the goldmine, I got the shaft.*”

The second choice for sellers is the Wall Street buyer. For some years, these purchasers accurately called themselves “leveraged buyout firms.” When that term got a bad name in the early 1990s – remember RJR and *Barbarians at the Gate?* – these buyers hastily relabeled themselves “private-equity.”

The name may have changed but that was all: Equity is dramatically *reduced* and debt is piled on in virtually all private-equity purchases. Indeed, the amount that a private-equity purchaser offers to the seller is in part determined by the buyer assessing the *maximum* amount of debt that can be placed on the acquired company.

Later, if things go well and equity begins to build, leveraged buy-out shops will often seek to re-leverage with new borrowings. They then typically use part of the proceeds to pay a huge dividend that drives equity sharply downward, sometimes even to a negative figure.

In truth, “equity” is a dirty word for many private-equity buyers; what they love is debt. And, because debt is currently so inexpensive, these buyers can frequently pay top dollar. Later, the business will be resold, often to another leveraged buyer. In effect, the business becomes a piece of merchandise.

Berkshire offers a third choice to the business owner who wishes to sell: a permanent home, in which the company’s people and culture will be retained (though, occasionally, management changes will be needed). Beyond that, any business we acquire dramatically increases its financial strength and ability to grow. Its days of dealing with banks and Wall Street analysts are also forever ended.

Some sellers don’t care about these matters. But, when sellers do, Berkshire does not have a lot of competition.

Sometimes pundits propose that Berkshire spin-off certain of its businesses. These suggestions make no sense. Our companies are worth more as part of Berkshire than as separate entities. One reason is our ability to move funds between businesses or into new ventures instantly and without tax. In addition, certain costs duplicate themselves, in full or part, if operations are separated. Here’s the most obvious example: Berkshire incurs nominal costs for its single board of directors; were our dozens of subsidiaries to be split off, the overall cost for directors would soar. So, too, would regulatory and administration expenditures.

Finally, there are sometimes important tax efficiencies for Subsidiary A because we own Subsidiary B. For example, certain tax credits that are available to our utilities are currently realizable only because we generate huge amounts of taxable income at other Berkshire operations. That gives Berkshire Hathaway Energy a major advantage over most public-utility companies in developing wind and solar projects.

Investment bankers, being paid as they are for action, constantly urge acquirers to pay 20% to 50% premiums over market price for publicly-held businesses. The bankers tell the buyer that the premium is justified for “control value” and for the wonderful things that are going to happen once the acquirer’s CEO takes charge. (What acquisition-hungry manager will challenge *that* assertion?)

A few years later, bankers – bearing straight faces – again appear and just as earnestly urge spinning off the earlier acquisition in order to “unlock shareholder value.” Spin-offs, of course, strip the owning company of its purported “control value” without any compensating payment. The bankers explain that the spun-off company will flourish because its management will be more entrepreneurial, having been freed from the smothering bureaucracy of the parent company. (So much for that talented CEO we met earlier.)

If the divesting company later wishes to reacquire the spun-off operation, it presumably would again be urged by its bankers to pay a hefty “control” premium for the privilege. (Mental “flexibility” of this sort by the banking fraternity has prompted the saying that fees too often lead to transactions rather than transactions leading to fees.)

It’s possible, of course, that someday a spin-off or sale at Berkshire would be required by regulators. Berkshire carried out such a spin-off in 1979, when new regulations for bank holding companies forced us to divest a bank we owned in Rockford, Illinois.

Voluntary spin-offs, though, make no sense for us: We would lose control value, capital-allocation flexibility and, in some cases, important tax advantages. The CEOs who brilliantly run our subsidiaries now would have difficulty in being as effective if running a spun-off operation, given the operating and financial advantages derived from Berkshire's ownership. Moreover, the parent and the spun-off operations, once separated, would likely incur moderately greater costs than existed when they were combined.

* * * * *

Before I depart the subject of spin-offs, let's look at a lesson to be learned from a conglomerate mentioned earlier: LTV. I'll summarize here, but those who enjoy a good financial story should read the piece about Jimmy Ling that ran in the October 1982 issue of *D Magazine*. Look it up on the Internet.

Through a lot of corporate razzle-dazzle, Ling had taken LTV from sales of only \$36 million in 1965 to number 14 on the Fortune 500 list just two years later. Ling, it should be noted, had never displayed any managerial skills. But Charlie told me long ago to never underestimate the man who overestimates himself. And Ling had no peer in that respect.

Ling's strategy, which he labeled "project redeployment," was to buy a large company and then partially spin off its various divisions. In LTV's 1966 annual report, he explained the magic that would follow: "Most importantly, acquisitions must meet the test of the 2 plus 2 equals 5 (or 6) formula." The press, the public and Wall Street loved this sort of talk.

In 1967 Ling bought Wilson & Co., a huge meatpacker that also had interests in golf equipment and pharmaceuticals. Soon after, he split the parent into three businesses, Wilson & Co. (meatpacking), Wilson Sporting Goods and Wilson Pharmaceuticals, each of which was to be partially spun off. These companies quickly became known on Wall Street as Meatball, Golf Ball and Goof Ball.

Soon thereafter, it became clear that, like Icarus, Ling had flown too close to the sun. By the early 1970s, Ling's empire was melting, and he himself had been spun off from LTV . . . that is, *fired*.

Periodically, financial markets will become divorced from reality – you can count on that. More Jimmy Lings will appear. They will look and sound authoritative. The press will hang on their every word. Bankers will fight for their business. What they are saying will recently have "worked." Their early followers will be feeling very clever. Our suggestion: Whatever their line, never forget that 2+2 will always equal 4. And when someone tells you how old-fashioned that math is --- zip up your wallet, take a vacation and come back in a few years to buy stocks at cheap prices.

* * * * *

Today Berkshire possesses (1) an unmatched collection of businesses, most of them now enjoying favorable economic prospects; (2) a cadre of outstanding managers who, with few exceptions, are unusually devoted to both the subsidiary they operate *and* to Berkshire; (3) an extraordinary diversity of earnings, premier financial strength and oceans of liquidity that we will maintain under *all* circumstances; (4) a first-choice ranking among many owners and managers who are contemplating sale of their businesses and (5) in a point related to the preceding item, a culture, distinctive in many ways from that of most large companies, that we have worked 50 years to develop and that is now rock-solid.

These strengths provide us a wonderful foundation on which to build.

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